The crisis was always predictable and debt a big Ponzi scheme In 1837, Hans Christian Andersen published the tale “The Emperor's New Costume” , better known as The King is Naked . He told the story of a king who was prudent and measured in everything but one thing, was obsessed with his wardrobe. One day, the king heard that they could make him the softest and most delicate fabric you could imagine. This garment also had the ability to be invisible to any stupid or incapable of office . Of course, there was no suit, everything was a hoax. Feeling somewhat nervous about whether he himself would be able to see the suit or not, the king first sent two of his trusted men to see him. Evidently, neither of them admitted that they were unable to see it and began to praise the garment. The whole city had heard about the fabulous suit and was looking forward to seeing how stupid his neighbor was. The scammers pretended to help the king wear the non-existent garment to attend a parade with her. All the townspeople emphatically praised the suit, fearing that their neighbors would realize that they could not see it, until a child said, “But if he goes naked! “ At that time people began to see reality and the whole crowd shouted that the emperor was naked. What happened to the Argentine economy, which suddenly went from having good growth indicators in the first months of the year to facing a brutal crisis? The answer is not complicated, Argentina was naked since the beginning of this government but for convenience the blindness was chosen.The financial markets , motivated by the possibility of making huge profits by betting at high interest rates on a stable dollar, and generating credit supply for Argentine bonds that financed our deficit, pretended to see solidity in the exchange promises that maintained by the government authorities. The government , motivated by this “trust” of markets, preferred to see itself with a sustained re-election projection in the issuance of debt to finance public expenditure, cut taxes on entrepreneurial sectors, and recompose the profits of service companies to generate a business climate that attracts investments. It was preferable to let the expected economic growth as a result of these measures solve the country's problems rather than move forward with structural reforms and pay the political cost of being a transitional government. The Argentines , moved by a blinding hope that is the result of our need to be better and live, someday, in a stable country, decided to give our vote of confidence and believe in the proposals of the government. But that “reality” was only possible to sustain it with the silence of their members, and the market was the first to shout “the government is naked.” Suddenly, the “blind trust” disappeared, we lost external financing and the problems facing the country could be clearly seen, since the initial economic assumptions were never fulfilled and the rain of dollars for productive investments never materialized.oacute;, with the flight of the speculative funds started an exchange rate that brought the dollar to historical highs, the high interest rates could not prevent the dollarization of portfolios but put in check the production system of the country's production system. Inflation accelerated its uptrend but this time it could not accompany the sharp rise of the dollar, but, month by month, it will nail us its dagger moving at prices and generating loss of purchasing power. On the other hand, the word “default” was again associated with Argentine debt . It is interesting to understand that the finance world does not care that the debt is paid, but that bonds maintain their quotation in order to buy and sell, collect interest and that at the time of maturities there are interested in andIn the case of Argentina, we turn tothe IMF to ensure that it is still a business to invest in debt bonds. We were looking to regain the confidence of the markets, but without real changes and communication failures that ended up exposing the president himself as at the mercy of circumstances, the crisis worsened . The money disbursements agreed with the IMF were not enough because the government shows the IMF as the last investor in a Ponzi Scheme , that is, the one who puts the money for others to go out. So the funds scheduled for 2018 did not guarantee continuity, it was necessary to guarantee 2019 and ensure re-election or agreement with the opposition. This is what is being negotiated, the country's long-term viability . But that is not free for the government or the opposition, it has a very high social and political cost . It implied that Argentina must show stronger fiscal numbers and regain confidence in its economic agenda to ensure a path of growth and sustainable debt. This is the real crisis, assuming reality . At the beginning of this government people accepted the economic costs affecting their well-being because they believed they were associated with the change of course that would stabilize the country and give it a better future. Today the anguish settles in society as a result of understanding that the economic cost comes from having to face the mistakes made, both by this and by previous governments, the future is no longer a consolation .
• Doctorado en Ciencia Política (UCA) • Postgrado sobre “Negocios en mercados emergentes” (EDI – India) • Presidente de la Fundación para la cooperación internacional ESEY • Ex Director Nacional de Relaciones Políticas e Institucionales